As widespread as this view is, there is at least one good reason to doubt it. It treats Supreme Court Justices too much as trend setters and too little as trend followers. Most Justices get their offices by dint of distinguished practice or public service, not extensive post-graduate academic training. Quite often, they assume the truth of normative opinions that either are conventional among legal elites when they serve on the Court, or were so when they went to law school. As John Maynard Keynes once explained, public officials often write into law political philosophy they learned "from academic scribblers of a few years back." They do so not "immediately, but after a certain interval; for in the field of economic and political philosophy there are not many who are influenced by new theories after they are twentyfive or thirty years of age. " 6 Obviously, no single article could explore this doubt in any comprehensive way. Yet there is a surprisingly simple way to demonstrate that it deserves attention-to reexamine how the Rehnquist Court has treated separation of powers. Separation of powers law counts as one of the great puzzles of the Rehnquist Court. Knowing what constitutional scholars knew in 1987/ there was every reason to expect that the Rehnquist Court would put separation of powers front and center in its constitutional agenda. Word for word, separation of powers takes up more space in the Constitution than any other doctrine. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia were widely known to sympathize with "original intent" principles of interpretation. 8 More important, as this Article will show, the Burger Court had left the Rehnquist Court with several excellent originalist precedents. Later, the Rehnquist Court would change the law of constitutional federalism using the precedential equivalent of whole cloth. 9 By contrast, at the beginning of the Rehnquist Court, the Court had all the precedents it needed to launch a sweeping revolution in separation of powers.
Yet there was no revolution. 10 The Rehnquist Court has declined several invitations to breathe more life into originalism through separation of powers law. In the process, the Court has continued a trend that has frustrated constitutional scholars for years, veering erratically between originalist and non-originalist interpretive methodologies with barely any explanation.
11 Did the Justices on the Burger Court take originalism seriously from the beginning? If not, why have the Burger and Rehnquist Courts applied originalism at all? Many academics have criticized the Burger and Rehnquist Courts for their inconsistency, 12 but no one has yet explained these Courts' track records convincingly.
This Article explains that puzzle. The Burger and Rehnquist Courts have used originalism and non-originalism selectively. Both Courts have chosen one or the other depending on which better promotes a theory of government this Article calls "the Progressive theory of apolitical administration." In simple form, this theory holds that government operates best when the Constitution is construed to stop elected politicians from interfering with expert bureaucrats. Leading Progressive academics deduced this theory of government from a more comprehensive political theory of a living Constitution. During the New Deal, the theory of apolitical administration lost its overt associations with living Constitution theory and became widely accepted, in legal education and among leading public-law officials and practitioners.
A broad bloc on the Burger and Rehnquist Courts has continued to use the Progressive theory of apolitical administration to decide hard separation of powers cases. That bloc has used the theory to decide whether to apply an originalist methodology or a non-originalist one in separation of powers cases. Since methodology often decides results in constitutional cases, this bloc has really used the Progressive theory of apolitical administration to decide the merits of separation of powers cases. This controlling bloc has been quite broad. Justice White was a consistent non-originalist, while Justices Scalia and Thomas have been fairly consistent originalists. The other members of the Court, however, have mixed and matched the two approaches. This group has included Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Powell, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter. More often than not, it included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Marshall. It probably includes Justices Ginsburg and Breyer.
The Progressive theory of apolitical administration does not come into play in every case, but it strongly influences cases that test how administrative agencies relate to the three traditional departments of government. The clearest test cases began in 1976 and continued through 1992. While the Court has not heard enough separation of powers cases in the last twelve years to say with certainty whether the theory continues to control, the available evidence suggests it does. Most of the time, the law under review promotes Progressive ideals by transferring power from the traditional three departments to an administrative agency. In such a case, the controlling bloc of Justices applies a deferential, non-originalist methodology called "New Deal functionalism" to uphold the administrative scheme. By contrast, when the law under challenge seems to flout the ideal of apolitical administration, alarm bells go off and the controlling bloc worries that Congress is trying to inject politics into administration. The Justices in this bloc then use originalism to declare the law unconstitutional.
This episode teaches two important lessons. The first relates to separation of powers. The Supreme Court does not take originalism nearly as seriously as scholars do. Although scholars disagree whether originalism is a desirable or workable approach to separation of powers, they do agree that, if the Court were to apply originalism consistently in separation of powers, it would need to invalidate most of the administrative state. 13 In reality, however, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have used originalism in a manner that dedicated originalists would find per- verse-only when doing so bolsters the constitutional case for the administrative state. Not to put too fine a point on it, but the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have paid attention to James Madison's opinions about separation of powers only when his views happen to dovetail with Frank Goodnow, Woodrow Wilson, and James Landis's plans for an independent and centralized national bureaucracy.
The second lesson is relevant to retrospectives that have or will soon be written about the Rehnquist Court.
14 In one of the most important areas of constitutional law, a broad cross-section of Justices on the Burger and Rehnquist Court took their bearings not from conservative political beliefs, not from originalintent jurisprudential beliefs, but from Progressive-New Deal political theory. Somewhere in their education or practice, the Justices on these Courts learned to think that the best way to run a government was to establish centralized bureaucracies staffed by well-educated lawyers and public-policy specialists, and substantially free from meddling by politicians. If similar connections explain other areas of the Court's case law, that Court has been much less conservative and much more conventional than most academics assume.
Before proceeding, let me briefly explain this Article's methodology. The Article is primarily descriptive. It is normative only to the extent that it uses a theory of government to describe and predict how the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have approached separation of powers cases. This interpretation could be described as "attitudinalist," in that it presumes that Justices decide cases primarily on the basis of political preferences shaped by Progressive political theory. 15 At the same time, this Article concentrates far more than attitudinalist studies usually do on how Justices may have formed their political preferences and attitudes. In addition, the Justices studied here could maintain with sincerity that they kept their political attitudes largely separate from their constitutional interpretation. The Progressive and functionalist ideas discussed throughout the Article could have convinced Justices that sound constitutional interpretation can and should consider the substantive consequences of different interpretations under consideration-in 16 legal scholars have not developed this genre of interpretation as systematically as have political scientists who study the Supreme Court. Ronald Kahn has called this approach "constitutive," by which he means that overarching normative ideas "constitute" in Justices' minds overarching but distinct understandings of law, government, and legal interpretation.17 This genre of scholarship, however, now goes by the name "institutionalism."
18 As Howard Gillman explains, institutionalists aim to describe the Supreme Court and other public institutions by reconstructing "those bundles of ideas and motivations that are associated with particular institutions."
19 They do so "in the hope that [they] can induce with some confidence the reasons that led a particular course of conduct. "
20 Stated in institutionalist terms, then, this Article's thesis is that the Progressive theory of apolitical administration is an especially big stick in the bundle of ideas and motivations that inform the current Court's decision making in separation of powers cases.
That said, the interpretation presented here may depart from institutionalist scholarship in one significant respect: By surveying the Burger and Rehnquist Courts' achievements in context of developments from the Progressive Era and the New Deal, this approach may paint with too broad a brush for many institutionalists. Institutionalists often prefer to describe motivations and intentions, in Gillman's words, "at a particular historical moment in a particular context." 21 There are sound reasons to focus on narrow historical context. This Article illustrates the 16. See McGinnis, supra note 5, at 498-99 (while it is "much too simple to say that the Supreme Court follows the election returns ... Justices pick up the outlines of broad social theories as they arc reflected in the media" or articulated by leading theorists).
17. RONALD KAHN, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, 1953 THEORY, -1993 THEORY, , at 4 (1994 risk: One must be careful not to assume that Justices on the Court in the last 30 years have understood and applied the theory of apolitical administration as Woodrow Wilson and other Progressives did. Progressives tended to understand that theory as one of several necessary implications of an encompassing Hegelian, "living Constitution" theory of the state, while contemporary lawyers and legal academics prefer to ground the theory in more technical and policy-oriented consequentialist claims.
At the same time, there are also useful reasons to take a longer view than institutionalists typically prefer. The main reason is a concern about interpretation. Contemporary separation of powers doctrine is hard to understand on its own terms, in large part because it is reconciling deep tensions between Progressive intentions, a constitutional design arguably inconsistent with those intentions, and pre-Progressive case law demonstrably inconsistent with those intentions. To understand the intentions behind current doctrine, it helps to start with the intentions of leading Progressives, which were quite clear, and then to interpret current doctrine as an attempt to reconcile the Constitution and the case law with those intentions.
22 This interpretive approach may in turn produce other benefits for constitutional scholarship if it bears fruit in subsequent studies of other areas of the Supreme Court's case law. It may contribute to the study of Supreme Court history, for its long view may help put the Rehnquist Court in sensible historical perspective in relation to the most important constitutional developments of the early twentieth century. Separately, the long view may provide useful examples to engage important issues in contemporary normative constitutional theory. The Rehnquist Court has opened up wideranging debates about the merits of "original intent" and "living Constitution" approaches to constitutional interpretation.
23 To appreciate the stakes of such debates, it is helpful to go back and find points of contact in theory and the case law between originalist and living-Constitution approaches to interpretation. In separation of powers law, that point of contact lies in the Progressive Era. Progressive political theory made a huge contribution to twentieth-century political practice by making popular and respected the theory of apolitical administration. This theory filled what leading Progressive academics perceived to be a gap both in American political practice and in the canon of political theory generally. For better or worse, both practice and theory had focused on questions about the ends of government to the exclusion of questions about the means of government. To fill that gap, the Progressives proposed that American governments teach a class of professional experts the tools of social and political control, insulate them from the ruckus of electoral and party politics, and then leave them rationally and efficiently to implement the legislative priorities that emerged from such politics.
The basic critique was sketched out in a seminal1887 article by Woodrow Wilson-then a political scientist, and later a president of Princeton, Governor of New Jersey, early leader of the Progressive wing of the Democratic Party, and ultimately President of the United States. 24 Wilson ambitiously called "the science of administration ... a birth of our own century, almost of our own generation" -and at the same time "the latest fruit of that study of the science of politics which was begun some twenty-two hundred years ago." 25 After asking rhetorically where the new science administration could be found, he answered, "Surely not on this side the sea," for " [t] he poisonous atmosphere of city government, the crooked secrets of state administration, the confusion, sinecurism, and corruption ever and again discovered in the bureaux at Washington forbid us to be- Wilson turned away from American practice to the canon of political theory, and here too he noticed a gap. Most political theory to his day, he believed, had focused on questions of ends and regimes-what objects governments should undertake, and which forms of government were best-equipped to attain those objects. This canon had overlooked a different question, namely "how law should be administered with enlightenment, with equity, with speed, and without friction." This question of means, he complained, had been "put aside as 'practical detail' which clerks could arrange after doctors had agreed upon principles."
27
To remedy this problem, Wilson proposed a science of politics that grafted the administrative successes of European monarchies onto the politics of American democracy. Notwithstanding their other defects, in monarchies, "administration has been organized to subserve the general weal with the simplicity and effectiveness vouchsafed only to the undertakings of a single will."
28 By contrast, notwithstanding their other advantages, in democracies, "which entered upon a season of constitutionmaking and popular reform before administration had received the impress of liberal princirle, administrative improvement has been tardy and half-done."
2 Such a democracy "finds it exceedingly difficult to close out [the constitution-making] business and open for the public a bureau of skilled economical administration."30 As of his time, democracies had been "more concerned to render government just and moderate than to make it facile, well-ordered, and effective." 31 Wilson acknowledged, tacitly comparing the United States to Prussia, that "(i]t is better to be untrained and free than to be servile and systematic. Still there is no denying that it would be better yet to be both free in spirit and proficient in practice." 32 As a result, Wilson concluded that "we have reached a time when administrative study and creation are imperatively necessary to the well-being of our governments saddled with the habits of a long period of constitutionmaking."33
Wilson and others concluded that the basic solution was to create a science of administration. Administration would take legislative priorities as a given, issued by the political, electoral, and legislative processes, and concentrate on achieving those priorities as rationally and efficiently as possible. The trick was to ensure that politics shape only the ends of administrationwithout tainting or interfering with the means of administration. As Wilson explained, "[t]he problem is to make public opinion efficient without suffering it to be meddlesome. Directly exercised, in the oversight of the daily details and in the choice of the daily means of government, public criticism is of course a clumsy nuisance, a rustic handling of delicate machinery. But as superintending the greater forces of formative policy alike in politics and administration, public criticism is altogether safe and beneficent, altogether indispensable." 34 In short, "administration "lies outside the proper sphere of politics .... Although politics sets the tasks for administration, it should not be suffered to manipulate its offices. "
35
The same themes came out later in the writings of Frank Goodnow, a professor of administrative law at Columbia and the first President of the American Political Science Association, the trade guild for the emerging discipline of political science.
36
Goodnow cited "American experience [as] conclusive" to prove that "in its extreme form [tripartite separation of powers] has been proven to be incapable of application to any concrete political organization." 37 Goodnow believed instead that "political functions group themselves naturally under two heads, which are equally applicable to the mental operations and the actions of self-conscious personalities." 38 In other words, "the action of the state as a political entity consists either in operations necessary to the expression of its will"-that is to say, politics-"or in operations necessary to the execution of its will"-that is to say, administration.
39
As Goodnow's comments suggest, many leading Progressives deduced the theory of apolitical administration from a more comprehensive "living Constitution" theory of political philosophy. Goodnow distinguished between administration and politics because he likened the state, "abstractly considered," "to an organism," with "a social mind and a social will." 40 Politics provided the will, administration supplied the mind. Similarly, Woodrow Wilson frequently called the American Constitution a "vehicle of life."
41
In any case, the Progressives drew several specific proposals from their understandings of the living Constitution and the theory of apolitical administration. They sought to reorder enabling statutes and structural constitutional law to recognize the fundamental Progressive distinction between politics and administration. The Progressives had four main proposals. First, to discharge Progressive theory's increased conception of social control, the country needed more administrators. Thus, Woodrow Wilson foresaw in 1887 "a corps of civil servants prepared by special schooled and drilled, after appointment, into a perfected organization."
42 Charles Evans Hughes, Governor of New York, Presidential candidate against Wilson, and Supreme Court Justice, observed: "The equipment of governmental departments or bureaus to aid in the enforcement of the laws has been a marked feature of recent legislation." " [I] n order that the bureau may accomplish the purpose of its creation," he explained, "the necessity of an enlarged force becomes apparent. " 43 Second, the Progressives demanded broader delegations. They expected bureaucratic agencies to assume the responsibility of generating substantive rules of conduct. Statutory law gets outdated quickly in the world of the living Constitution. As Elihu Root, a leading lawyer, U.S. Senator, and Cabinet Secretary to two Republican Presidents, explained, "As any community passes from simple to complex conditions the only way in which government can deal with the increased burdens thrown upon it is by the delegation of power to be exercised in detail by subordinate agents, subject to the control of general directions prescribed by superior authority. " 44 
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old doctrine prohibiting the delegation of legislative power has virtually retired from the field and given up the fight." 45 Of course, the Progressives did recognize, as Charles Evans Hughes did, that "in the unchecked discretion of legislatures and administrative officers lie opportunities of tyranny. " 46 But as most Progressives did, Hughes judged it better to err on the side of action than inaction. " [T] here is no greater mistake," he warned, "than to withhold the power to do well in the fear of ill." 47 Third, the Progressives transferred adjudicative functions from courts and executive-branch departments to bureaucrats. The Progressives finessed possible constitutional objections by recognizing a new category of "quasi-judicial" administrative functions. As Frank Goodnow explained, judicial courts were not competent to apply law to facts in situations in which "such performance requires the possession of considerable technical knowledge." 48 Separately, Goodnow regarded many some clearly executive functions as "quasi-judicial in character" because they "must be as impartial and free from prejudice as possible,"49 and require "wide information and varied knowledge," which "must in many instances be acquired by some governmental authority which is reasonably permanent in character. " 50 Last, and most important, the Progressives demanded that the bureaucrats be insulated from politics. For the Progressives, politics and administration were like oil and water. In Goodnow's diagnosis, while "[p ]opular government requires that ...
[a ]dministration must ... be subjected to the control of politics, " 51 it threatens to "hinder[] instead of aid[] the spontaneous expression of the public will, and hampers its efficient execution."52 Goodnow warned that "[p]olitical control over administrative functions is liable ... to produce inefficient administration in that it makes administrative officers feel that what is demanded of them is not so much work that will improve their own department, as compliance with the behests of the political party. "
53 Of course, one might question whether administrators are as independent of party politics as Goodnow seems to have assumed. Nevertheless, if Woodrow Wilson is representative, the Progressives did not think there was a problem. Wilson was positive that administrators could recognize and implement the will American people independent of parties or other parochial interests. He assumed it was possible to establish "a civil service cultured and self-sufficient enough to act with sense and vigor, and yet so intimately connected with the popular thought, by means of elections and public counsel, as to find arbitrariness or class spirit out of the question." 54 The Progressives assumed that two tools would insulate bureaucrats from the political branches. One consisted of legal protections. To protect administrators from the executive, Goodnow proposed to give agency officers a legal "position reasonably permanent in character and reasonable free from political influence," including "considerable permanence of tenure," similar to judicial tenure. 55 The Progressives also assumed that the bureaucracy would remain as free from Congress as they hoped to make it free from the President. Woodrow Wilson, for instance, scorned the possibility that "those who administer the law ... shall be in leading strings and shall be reduced to be the mere ministerial agents of a representative assembly."
56
The Progressives' other tool lay in public opinion. The Progressives hoped to educate public and elite opinion that administration was best kept separate from politics. Hughes proposed to attract the best and brightest to administrative service by "attach[ing] to the office the degree of honour, which is commensurate with the importance of the work to be performed. "
57 Similarly, Goodnow hoped to foster a "sound public opinion" toward the bureaucracies. At the end of the day, Goodnow concluded, the security provided by public opinion "is the only protection which can be offered to either the judicial or administrative authorities against the exercise of political influences by bodies ... in the extra-governmental-political-system. " 
B. NEW DEAL FUNCTIONALISM
Law and public opinion worked together to convert the Progressives' blueprint for apolitical administration into reality. By the late New Deal, the opinions of legal elites and legal academics tracked the Progressives' agenda for administrative government. While this article cannot survey this New Deal transformation in any comprehensive way, the highlights are reasonably clear and have been described by leading historians. 5 9
To begin with, opinions changed in the law schools. For instance, as recalled by Louis Oberdorfer, one of Byron White's colleagues at Yale Law School, by 1939 the students were learning a Legal Realist catechism that held, among other things:
4. Congressmen and legislators are crooks, fools, or both.
5. The only proper way to allocate resources is to create an administrative agency-staffed by experts-such as former Professor Douglas or former Professor Fortas.
60
While Oberdorfer (later a federal judge) was almost certainly poking fun at his professors for their zealousness, it is just as clear that he learned the underlying Progressive message. Separation of powers law also changed in this period. Indeed, most lawyers do not appreciate the extent to which the pre-1900 conception of separation of powers law had receded before the famous showdown between President Roosevelt and the Court from 1935 to 1937. 61 The Court had loosened the nondelegation doctrine from 1900 through the early New Deal. 62 a nondelegation challenge to a radio statute requiring the Federal Radio Commission to "make a fair and equitable allocation of licenses," "as public convenience, interest or necessity requires"); Avent v. United States, 266 U.S. 127 (1924) (upholding a transportation statute to prescribe rules to break emergency rules for railroads when "reasonable" and "in the interest of the public and of commerce"); Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904) (rejecting a nondelcgation challenge to a law making it illegal "to import or bring into the United States any merchandise as tea which is inferior in purity, quality, and fitness" in relation to standards for the same promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury). 6 Schechter Poultry and Panama Ryan were the first two cases in which the Supreme Court used the non-delegation doctrine to strike down acts of Congress.
68 But in the context of Crowell, Humphrey's Executor, and especially the trend in nondelegation law, these two decisions were extreme cases. Both considered challenges to the National Industrial Recovery Act, in which Congress had given the President broad latitude to certify codes of fair competition for a wide range of American industries. Shortly after Panama Ryan and Schechter Poultry, the Court upheld other New Deal laws as against non-delegation challenges. 69 In light of the deferential cases before and after, Schechter Poultry and Panama Ryan quickly came to be understood as standing for the proposition that Congress violates the non-delegation doctrine only when it gives the President a blank check over most of the economy in a single legislative act. These New Deal cases laid the basis for a new, nonoriginalist narrative in separation of powers law. This narrative now goes by the name of "functionalism." To avoid confusing this specific narrative with the general category of functionalist interpretive theory, this article will refer to the narrative as "New Deal functionalism."
71 New Deal functionalism differed from the Progressive theory of apolitical administration in at least two respects. It did not appeal to overarching ideas about a "living Constitution" as the central idea from which specific separation of powers prescriptions emanated. In addition, it did not attack head-on pre-1900 understandings of separation of powers, as Frank Goodnow had when he concluded that tripartite separation of powers "has been proven to be incagable of application to any concrete political organization," or as Woodrow Wilson had when he complained that the Framers had had "no clear analysis of the matter in their own thoughts" when they wrote the Constitution to implement Montequieu's ideas about separation of powers.
73 Rather, New Deal functionalism respected tripartite separation of powers in broad form and then made the law significantly more deferential and proadministration in the details. It converted separation of powers law from a fairly rulebound exercise into a process of balancing competing interests. The balance weighed interests depending on how well they accorded with the Progressive theory of apolitical administration.
The transition is apparent in James Landis's 1938 book, The Administrative Process, an influential attempt by a leading academic to articulate the constitutional case for administrative agencies. Like the Progressives, Landis assumed that the object of constitutional interpretation was "to adapt governmental technique ... to modern needs." 74 Like the Progressives, Landis also attributed the adaptation in the early twentieth century to such factors as "the growing interdependence of individuals," 81 Politically, the FEC scheme represented an important precedent against the separation of politics and administration. The FEC enjoyed the full panoply of powers traditionally enjoyed by administrative agencies-the powers to make legislative rules, prosecute violations of its organic statute and rules, and adjudicate those prosecutions, subject to limited judicial review.
82 If Congress could appoint the FEC's officers, there was no principled reason why Congress could not assume the power to appoint every other agency's officers.
The FEC Act forced the Court to make a choice between political ends and interpretive means. One easy way to invalidate the Act was to revive originalist principles of interpretation in separation of powers law. But the Court could not do so without reopening the many questions about judicial activism and judicial review that the New Deal had settled. On the other hand, if the Court applied New Deal functionalism, it would have been extremely difficult for the Court to invalidate a law in which Congress was asserting its political will over an administrative agency.
The Court sided with Progressive government theory. In Buckley, the Court invalidated the FEC Act by resuscitating originalism-or, as the rest of this Article will describe it, "original intent formalism." This approach is "formalistic" because, as Thomas Merrill explains, it "insists that the structural provisions of the Constitution establish a set of rules-an 'instruction manual'-that must be followed whatever the consequences. " 83 This formalism is an "original-intent" formalism because the original meaning of the Constitution supplies the instructions in that socalled manual. In Buckley, the Court appealed to original meaning by insisting that "[t]he principle of separation of powers was not simply an abstract generalization in the minds of the Framers: it was woven into the document that they drafted in Phila- delphia in the summer of 1787. " 84 Read formalistically, since the appointments clause specifically authorizes only the President, the heads of departments, and the courts of law to appoint officers, it implicitly withholds that power from Congress. 85 The Court acknowledged that Congress might have "had good reason for not vesting in a Commission composed wholly of Presidential appointees the authority to administer the act," but it formalistically insisted that any such reasons "do not by themselves warrant a distortion of the Framers' work." 86 As these quotations suggest, at a superficial level Buckley's holding seems not to rely on policy at all. Below the surface, however, the decision relies heavily on Progressive norms about apolitical expertise. Buckley's holding created tensions with such separation of powers precedents as Crowell and Humphrey's Executor. Again, the FEC's commissioners exercised standard agency rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudicative powers. Since the Court expressed keen interest in what the Framers had said about the appointments clause issue, perhaps the Court might also have considered what the Framers had said about modern administrators. Publius, after all, had assumed in passing that the notion of indeJ?endent, non-partisan administration was a "political heresy." He declared emphatically that the combination of government functions in one officer is "the very definition of tyranny." 88 The Court did not appeal to Publius's authority on these points, however. The Court held that the FEC's rulemaking, prosecutorial, and adjudicative powers were innocuous, "of kinds usually performed by independent regulatory agencies." 89 Such powers, the Court suggested, were best "exercised free from day-to-day supervision of either Congress or the Executive Branch," and "essential to effective and impartial administration of the entire substantive framework of the Act." 101 challenged a "legislative veto" provision. The Immigration and Naturalization Act gave the Attorney General power to suspend the deportations of aliens not lawfully in the United States if the aliens satisfied certain criteria, but it also reserved to each house of Congress the power to reverse such suspensions and thereby to reinstate the deportations.
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Like the appointments scheme challenged in Buckley, the legislative veto directly threatened the ideal of apolitical administration. Policymaking was apolitical as long as Congress delegated regulatory powers to agencies and then left the agency to make the final decision. Policymaking became political, however, if Congress kept a veto hanging over the agency's decision.
Nevertheless, the Court declared the legislative veto unconstitutional because it threatened the ideal of apolitical administration. A solid majorit¥ of the Court embraced an originalintent formalist analysis. Burger cited The Federalist for the principle that bicameralism and presentment "establish[) a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the community against the effects of faction,grecipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good."
1 Chadha was especially telling because the legislative veto was not a constitutional novelty. As the Court noted, as of 1983 Congress had inserted nearly 300 legislative-veto provisions into administrative statutes, many during the New Deal.
108 If the Court's separation of powers law had been motivated by the intention not to disturb administrative institutions with a solid pedigree in history and practice, the Court should have upheld the legislative veto.
Chadha could plausibly have been read to signal that the Court would embrace formalism and broadly throughout separation of powers law. The simplest way to test this view was to ask whether the Court would start applying the interpretive approach of Chadha, a formalist Article I case, to the main Article I doctrine, the nondelegation doctrine. discouraged this approach-on the authority of the Progressive theory of apolitical administration. In Chadha, Congress had made a plausible nondelegation argument in its brief. By the Court's own formalistic definition of "legislative power," Congress argued, the power to suspend deportations was just as "legislative" as the power to veto the suspension. If the Court were set on formalism, it would need to explain why the Attorney General, an executive officer, could exercise legislative power without raising nondelegation problems. Not so, held the Court. That question raised "only a question of delegation doctrine," and "Congress' authority to delegate portions of its power to administrative agencies provides no support for the argument that Congress can constitutionally control administration of the laws by way of a congressional veto."
109
As the evidence rolled in after Chadha, it became clear that the Court still subscribed to the New Deal's functionalist rendition of nondelegation doctrine. The clearest sign of the trend came in the 1989 decision Mistretta v. United States, 110 which upheld the U.S. Sentencing Commission's powers to promulgate legislative formulas for federal district courts to follow in criminal sentencings. Unlike the legislative veto, the Sentencing Commission was a constitutional novelty in an important respect. The standard-issue administrative agency makes legislative rules on behalf of or in place of the President; the Sentencing Commission promulgates such rules for Article III courts. That difference made the Commission enough of a constitutional sport for the Court to attack the Commission if it so desired. Nevertheless, in the Court's mind, Congress's delegation to the Commission raised essentially the same policy issues as any other delegation to any other agency.
111 Thus, in a majority opinion joined by everyone except Justice Scalia, Justice Blackmun restated nondelegation doctrine in classic New Deal functionalist terms. Blackmun distinguished Chadha on legislative-usurpation grounds, recognizing that Congress may not "exercise the responsibilities of other Branches or ... reassign powers vested by the Constitution."
112 In all other cases, however, Mistretta signaled that courts should uphold delegations as long as "Congress clearly delineates the general policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority. "
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As Justice O'Connor had in Thomas and Schor, Justice Blackmun balanced the competing policy interests in Mistretta with Progressive eyes and thumbs. Since Chadha had cited The Federalist Papers as controlling authority, perhaps Mistretta could have taken judicial notice that Publius had defined "law" as "a rule of action" and asked rhetorically, "how can that be a rule, which is little known, and less fixed?" 114 In Mistretta, however, Justice Blackmun cited Progressive policy arguments as authoritative. The nondelegation doctrine, he explained, "has been driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives."
115 Since the Commission gave the judiciary power over both rulemaking and rule application in sentencing, perhaps Justice Blackmun could have considered Publius's and Montesquieu's warning that "there can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or body ofmagistrates." 2 The most important feature of the Act was that Congress, and not the President, was exercising the removal power.
The Balanced Budget Act created a threatening precedent for apolitical administration. While the Comptroller General is not an ordinary administrator, the Comptroller's responsibility to prepare binding budget estimates was executive, like the prosecutorial and adjudicative functions of many agencies. 123 
If
Congress could constitutionally arrogate the power to fire the Comptroller, it could cite the Balanced Budget Act as precedent for rewriting many agency enabling statutes to assume for itself the power to fire agency officers.
The Court thus switched to original-intent formalism. (Bowsher was particularly ironic because it was handed down on the same day as the very functionalist Schor decision, discussed above in part II.C. The Rehnquist Court has decided other separation of powers cases that do not directly relate to the Progressive theory of apolitical administration. In Clinton v. New York, 135 the Court invalidated provisions of the Line Item Veto Act giving the President the power to use his judgment to cancel enacted spending appropriations. Clinton is a hard case to classify, because it forced Justices to decide between two competing attachments. The Court majority probably decided the case in the same vein as Panama Oil, Schechter Poultry, 136 and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 137 As those cases used originalist non-delegation law to stop the President from exercising untrammeled power over the entire U.S. economy, perhaps Clinton v. New York used them to stop the President from exercising untrammeled power over the entire U.S. federal budget. Justices Scalia, O'Connor, and Breyer dissented in Clinton, on the ground that the Court's holding threatened to resuscitate the non-delegation doctrine. 133. 531 U.S. 457 (2001). Justice Thomas concurred in Whitman to signal his interest in reconsidering whether the Court's nondelegation doctrine is correct, but no one else joined this original-intent concurrence.
134. Consider Gary Lawson's interpretation of the case, supra note 68, at 328-29.
135. 524 u.s. 417 (1998).
136. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
137. 343 u.s. 579 (1952) .
138. Cite Clinton Steven Calabresi and Michael Rappaport agree with Breyer, as they did because they support wide delegations on Progressive and functionalist grounds; Scalia voted with them because he opposes judge-made all-the-circumstances tests and the nondelegation doctrine requires such a test. 139 Separately, in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, a six-vote majority of the Rehnquist Court struck down a federal securities law that required the federal courts to reopen final judgments entered before the law's enactment and to apply new and retroactive rules to the reopened cases.
140 Plaut falls in the same line as the reasoning of the Northern Pipeline plurality: Both used formalism to stop Congress from threatening what every Justice except Justice Stevens agreed was a threat to the autonomy and longrange interests of the Article III courts.
The Rehnquist Court has handed down several opinions in appointments clause cases. One is clearly formalist, 141 while three opinions are hard to classify as formalist or functionalist.
142
These decisions, however, are all rather peripheral in relation to the themes considered in this article. None challenged the constitutional status of an administrative law judge who has not been appointed directly by the President, an agency head, or a court. When such a challenge arises, the judge in question may lose his job under Buckley. If Buckley controls, that unlucky administrative job will lose his job. 143 But then again, if the Court follows its track record over the last 30 years, surely it will limit Buckley as Thomas limited Northern Pipeline, non-delegation cases have limited Chadha, and Morrison limited Bowsher. The last Rehnquist Court separation of powers case, however, confirms that a broad bloc on the Rehnquist Court continues to rely on Progressive theory to decide the separation of powers cases that directly threaten administrative agencies. 145 In Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Congress established a review board, composed of members of Congress, to oversee the commission that supervised Dulles and National Airports near Washington, D.C. This commission was composed of federal, state, and District of Columbia officials, but the Court likened it to an ordinary federal agency. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Stevens called it a "non-political, independent authority."
146
The enabling statute allowed Congressmen sit in review and management of the airport commission's functions.
147
Stevens relied on Progressive administrative theory more explicitly than any other case considered thus far. Stevens chose to apply original-intent formalism precisely because the MW AA scheme threatened to compromise agency autonomy. He offered an example: If the act under challenge were not invalidated, he worried, it would "enable [Congress] or its agents to retain control, outside the ordinary legislative process, of the activities of state grant recipients char~ed with executing virtually every aspect of national policy."
14 To prevent this possibility, Stevens applied Chadha and Bowsher in the alternative. If the review board's functions were legislative, its structure violated Chadha because the board did not follow bicameralism and presentment; if those functions were executive, the board's structure violated Bowsher because members of Congress could not perform executive functions. Justice Stevens thus used original-intent formalism to stop an act from "provid[ing] a blueprint for extensive expansion of the legislative power beyond its constitutionally confined role." 149 by construing Buckley's test for distinguishing between "officers" and "employees" so narrowly that the AU was a mere employee, outside the coverage of the appointments clause.
145 
III. ALTERNATE EXPLANATIONS OF SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW ON THE BURGER AND REHNQUIST COURTS
This account may not explain the specific beliefs and behavior of every Justice on the Court, and it may not explain stray cases like Clinton v. City of New York or Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm. All the same, it does explain how the late Burger Court and the Rehnquist Court have behaved as groups. In addition, different Justices could have seen the issues differently and still contributed to the same overarching pattern. If one judges Chief Justice Burger by his opinions in Chadha and Bowsher, he seemed to believe there was no contradiction whatsoever between the Court's New Deal functionalist and its original-intent formalist cases. 150 If one parses Justice Stevens' Court opinion in Washington Airports, he seems quite aware he is using originalintent formalism to dispose of the law while he is using Progressive ideas about administration to settle the merits. At the other extreme, it is reported that then-Justice Rehnquist authored the separation of powers sections of the Court's per curiam opinion in Buckley.
151 While an Associate Justice, Rehnquist wrote other opinions unusually sympathetic to original-intent formalism. 757-58 (1996) (declaring, in a nondelegation case doing nothing to reconsider the deference in the Court's nondelegation law, "By allocating specific powers and responsibilities to a branch fitted to the task, the Framers created a National Government that is both effective and accountable.").
151. At the same time, this originalist/judicial-restraint explanation cannot explain all of the features of the controlling bloc's behavior. When laws threatened the idea of apolitical administration, these Justices were much more activist than the judicialrestraint hypothesis suggests. In particular, these Justices were willing to enforce in quite activist fashion Article I, II, and III's vesting clauses, which are ~uite open-ended and indeterminate as constitutional clauses go 56 -even if they would have shied away from enforcing the same language in nondelegation cases and other cases reinforcing the apolitical administrative model. Chadha illustrates. The majority decided the case under the rather specific bicameralism and presentment clauses. To do so, however, the Court first needed to find that the legislative veto was an exercise of legislative power. Chief Justice Burger shoehorned the power to suspend the deportation of aliens into the "legislative Power" when exercised by Congress-even though he called the same power "executive" when exercised by the Attorney General. 157 (For good measure, Justice Powell concurred separately to shoehorn the veto into the open-ended judiciary vesting clause, on the ground that the reversal of the Attorney General's suspension was inherently "judicial. " 158 ) In short, Progressive ideas about apolitical administration seem to have encouraged Justices to be confident enough to be activist when constitutional text could not.
Another alternative explanation holds that the Court shifts between methodologies to divide government and protect individual freedom. Thomas Merrill and Elizabeth Magill have considered this possibility (although, as with the previous possibility, both raise it conceptually and normatively but not descriptively).159 In a recent article, Magill argues that "differing approaches" to separation of powers law all "serve the same overarching goal: cabining the exercise of state power by fragmenting that power among three distinct and potent branches of government."160 It would not be surprising if the Justices in the controlling bloc cite diffusion-of-powers concerns, but these concerns cannot justify the Court's track record by themselves. The Justices in this bloc worry about diffusion of power when Congress threatens to exercise several powers at once, but not when bureaucrats pose a similar threat. This insight also explains why the Court tries to reconcile New Deal functionalism and originalintent formalism on the ground that the latter applies only when Congress "usurps" or "aggrandizes" the prerogatives of the agencies and the other branches of the government. 161 Congressional aggrandizement is especially dangerous because, from the Progressives' point of view, it is the "political" branch par excellence.
Others might question whether Progressive ideas are too far out of vogue for judges and lawyers to take them seriously 80 years later. Elizabeth Magill has criticized this article's interpretation on that ground. The "serious skepticism of agency decisionmaking that is now reflected in administrative law doc-trines," she argues, makes it implausible to think that courts subscribe to Progressive ideas about administration in their constitutional docket. 162 Magill refers here to the requirements of noticeand-comment rulemaking, which force regulators to be transparent about the choices they make when they promulgate legislative rules/ 63 and the "hard look" doctrine, which forces agencies to identify sensitive legislative policy judgments they make. 164 These doctrines arose in the 1970s, during an era in which conservative public-choice economists and liberal federal judges both suspected that agencies were captured by the interests they were supposed to be regulating. 165 One might also raise similar objections regarding the Chevron doctrine, which instructs courts to defer to agencies' reasonable interpretations of their organic statutes except when the statutory language clearly requires a different result. 166 The Chevron doctrine, one might argue, shows that conservatives want to transfer the power to construe broad delegations from independent agencies to the President. 167 In each of these subconstitutional administrativelaw doctrines, the broad coalitions in the constitutional separation of powers cases dissolve and more familiar conservativeliberal divisions resurface. The conservatives support executive and agency powers, while the liberals remain skeptical of agencies and prefer vigorous judicial review.
These objections fairly describe the surface of administrative law now, but it is crucial to put the relevant doctrines in their proper, subconstitutional perspective. These specific disagreements play out within the context of a broader institutionalist agreement about the Progressive theory of apolitical administration. Contemporary judicial conservatives and liberals may harbor doubts about Progressive administrative theory, but they agree with it and with each other far more than they agree 162. Magill, supra note 10, at 71 n.l01 (2004 with the political theory that informs the original and formalist Constitution. With the possible exception of Justice Thomas, all the Justices accept that the agencies should or inevitably will get broad delegations from Congress. 168 With the possible exceptions of Thomas and Scalia, all accept that agencies should or inevitably will get the power to grosecute and adjudicate along with those rulemaking powers.
1
With the same possible exceptions, all accept that agencies are generally better off when not directly supervised by members of Congress, who are more parochial and political and less cognizant of the national interest than the President. To be sure, all of these Justices are somewhat skeptical about the Progressive blueprint. They all worry that capture problems corrupt the Progressive ideal of apolitical administration, and then fall out disagreeing about whether the President or the courts can better mitigate the capture problem. Even so, it is also telling that these normative debates are waged in the trenches of administrative law's subconstitutional doctrines, not constitutional separation of powers. With the possible exceptions of Justices Scalia and Thomas, everyone on the Burger and Rehnquist Courts has agreed that the Progressive approach was more or less inevitable. They disagree about how to fix some of that approach's side effects.
Finally, it is worth noting that this Article's thesis can explain some otherwise strange puzzles about the Court's behavior. 17° Calabresi has identified a strange puzzle, which is explained by "institutionalist" ideas about judicial power: The control group on the Burger Court did not understand the Article III courts' institutional interests as Calabresi does (or as the framers probably did), but rather as the Progressives did. Under the Progressive theory of apolitical administration, better not to distract federal judges with questions of pesticide or futures law; far more preferable for courts to leave such technical questions to administrative experts, and focus their attention elsewhere. 168 . See 
IV. SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW AND THE LEGACY OF THE REHNQUIST COURT
Let us conclude by considering how this interpretation affects our perceptions of the Rehnquist Court. Of course, the conclusions in this Part are provisional because of the "blind men and the elephant" problem: What passes as an accurate explanation of separation of powers law may seem a gross overgeneralization as applied to free speech, privacy, or federalism. Nevertheless, it is striking that, in a first-rank area of constitutional law, everyone on the Court except Justice Thomas and sometimes Justice Scalia used two sharply different methodologies to reinforce a Progressive/New Deal understanding of government structure. This pattern may call into question many portraits of the Rehnquist Court.
One dominant theme in the retrospectives written thus far holds that the Rehnquist Court has been a strongly conservative Court. The more hostile reviews suggest that that the Rehnquist Court has been "conservative, not in the sense that it is following conservative judicial principles, but rather ... in the sense that it is animated by the right-wing political agenda." 171 More sympathetic interpretations cast doubt on whether its conservative developments are illegitimate. For example, John McGinnis has suggested that the Rehnquist Court has drawn on broad ideas shared by conservative elites during the 1970s and 1980s in the same indirect manner in which the late Warren Court and Justice Brennan's wing on the Burger Court drew on New Deal and Great Society trends among liberal elites. 172 The Rehnquist Court's track record in separation of powers cases belies both of these interpretations. It does not by itself refute either interpretation, but it does identify strong limits on the extent to which the Rehnquist Court has been politically conservative. The Progressive theory of apolitical administration has been conventional wisdom among legal elites in this country since at least the middle of the twentieth century. During the 1980s and 1990s, Justices Scalia and Thomas and many younger conservative constitutional-law academics developed a comprehensive original-meaning critique of separation of powers, encouraged in large part by precedents like Buckley and Chadha. 173 That critique, however, seems to have had little influence on otherwise-conservative Justices like Kennedy, O'Connor, and to an extent Rehnquist.
To be sure, the Rehnquist Court has reached more conservative results in other areas, and an encompassing retrospective would need to reconcile separation of powers with such areas. But the case study presented here suggests it is important to examine whether and to what extent changes elsewhere were limited by elite conventional wisdoms on a par with the Progressive theory of apolitical administration. For instance, as I have shown elsewhere, academic property theory, land-use law, and land-use scholarship stopped the Rehnquist Court from laying down anything more than extreme-case limitations on contemporary landuse regulations. 174 And as Michael Rappaport has suggested, most of the Rehnquist Court's federalism decisions are "mainly of symbolic importance." 175 As I hope to explain in subsequent scholarship, 176 Progressive-New Deal attitudes toward federalism and centralized government still command enough respect across the Rehnquist Court to have limited the scope of its federalism project.
Another common theme holds that the Rehnquist Court has been an "activist" court. 177 Of course this theme can be hard to engage, because the term "activist" is slippery and begs basic questions about what counts as "sound" or "activist" interprettation. Even so, the Court's track record in separation of powers defies the most common characterization. The Court intervened only when Congress tried to exercise direct control over an agency (Washington Airports) or Article III courts (Plaut), or to give extremely broad powers to the President (Clinton v. City of New York). In the independent-counsel provisions in Morrison and the Sentencing Guideline provisions in Mistretta, the Court let pass federal laws that could plausibly have been considered drastic changes from the status quo. In short, the Court was not activist very often in the sense that it defied Congress's will; only once, in Clinton, could it be said that the Court was activist in the sense that it defied the expectations of knowledgeable legal observers.
Indeed, separation of powers is especially telling because it teaches as much about the Court's critics as it does about the Court. Separation of powers provides a nice contrast to federalism, takings, and other fertile fields on the Rehnquist Court, because it blossomed, peaked, and faded about a decade before these other fields. 180 The academic commentary became less critical and more accommodating in the late 1980s, as the late Burger and early Rehnquist Court confined the originalist revival. Some articles chided the Court for its incoherence, 181 while others benignly recast the cases to conform to ProgressiveNew Deal administrative theory. 182 In the 1990s, after it became clear that separation of powers was no longer a growth area, the field ceased to interest most constitutional scholars who are not originalists. The commentary on the Rehnquist Court's federalism project, if more heated, still seems to be following the same trend: The Rehnquist Court's early forays into federalism provoked voluminous scholarship, 183 but recent decisions favoring Congress 184 have attracted much less attention. In short, Progres-sive-New Deal expectations may go a long way in shaping constitutional scholars' expectations about what counts as "proper" adjudication and what counts as "activism" in structural constitutional law. The separation of powers cases also correct another account of the Rehnquist Court-the "leadership" explanation. Mark Tushnet has suggested that one of the "largely unremarked" features of the Rehnquist Court has been that the liberal Justices have presented a unified front on many issues. 185 He attributes this fact to several factors-especially partisan divisions between the traditional and movement Republicans on the Court, 186 and Justice Stevens' "leadership" skills, 187 which he contends have been superior to the Chief Justice's or Justice Scalia's.
188
To appreciate the more insightful aspects of Tushnet's interpretation, it helps to consider how the liberals, Tushnet's "traditional" Republicans, and his "movement" all stand jurisprudentially in relation to each other. On large issues of constitutional structure, it does not take much leadership to convince the liberals to hang together. In separation of powers and probably elsewhere, they have stayed within the conventional wisdom about separation of powers. Similarly, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor are all much more inclined to be "led" toward the liberals than toward the diehard conservatives. Like the liberals, Kennedy and O'Connor assume that the country's political and constitutional developments through the 1970s are basically legitimate and have been salutary for the country. That is why they have voted in lockstep with the liberals in separation of powers cases. By contrast, because Justices Scalia and Thomas are originalists, their methodology raises unsettling questions about the New Deal transformation in separation of powers. 187. Tushnet, mpra note 185, at 289. That said, Tushnet does not make this leadership claim as assertively in his book as he does in the articles that led to the book. In the book, Tushnet does not treat Stevens at length, suggesting only that Justice Stevens was more strategic than the Chief Justice at assigning opinions to keep the moderates on board liberal positions. See TUSHNET, supra note 186, at 86; see also id. at 112-13 (Stevens' background).
188. See TUSHNET, supra note 186, at 86 (Rehnquist's refusal to assign opinion strategically); id. at 263 (Rehnquist's unimaginative opinion writing); id. at 147-41 (Scalia's intemperateness toward his colleagues and injudiciousness in print).
189. Again, with the exception that Scalia refuses to adopt what he understands to be the original meaning of the non-delegation doctrine as a rule for judicial decision. See Finally, then, separation of powers cases confirm the last broad portrait of the Rehnquist Court-that it is in fact an "O'Kennedy Court." While earlier retrospectives tended to portray the struggle between the liberal and conservatives on the Court,' 90 a consensus is now emerging that Justices O'Connor and Kennedy are key to understanding the behavior of the Rehnquist Court. Separation of powers cases confirm this later consensus, supplementing it mainly to underscore how important it is to appreciate O'Connor and Kennedy's basic jurisprudential commitments. Some accounts suggest that O'Connor and Kennedy vote primarily in response to trends in elections or in Congress. 191 
CONCLUSION
Over the last 30 years, the Progressive theory of apolitical administration seem to have permeated the "fundamental law" that informs the Supreme Court's separation of powers cases. When it applies, this theory predicts how the Court will decide separation of powers challenges. It predicts how the Court will decide the merits of such cases. It predicts whether the Court will apply original-intent formalism or New Deal functionalism. When the Court applies original-intent formalism, Progressive principles explain how the Court manages to limit its originalist holdings so as not to undermine the administrative state. Finally, when the Court balances interests using New Deal functionalism, the same principles determine how heavily competing policy interests hang in the functionalist balance.
This connection to Progressive political theory explains an important puzzle in separation of powers law over the last thirty years, but it also has important ramifications for studying the Supreme Court generally. The separation of powers case study presented here helps put the late Burger Court and the Rehnquist Court in a sensible historical perspective in relation to previous Courts. The same case study also offers useful warnings for ongoing efforts to develop retrospectives of the Rehnquist Court. The Rehnquist Court has been activist or conservative in important respects. Even so, we must not forget that the Rehnquist Court is also limited in important respects by Progressive and New Deal ideas, which continue to influence academics and lawyers' expectations about good government and good constitutional interpretation.
